The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS), signed in September 2018, was hailed as the only path to peace, built on negotiations and compromises addressing the interests of all warring parties. Its signatories are bound to the spirit and letter of the agreement.

The rebellions, waged by politicians and military officers since 2013, were ostensibly about poor governance and the need for change. However, a closer look at the motivations of key figures reveals a different calculus.

Prior to the war, many of these politicians and generals had significant business interests. When the conflict began, the incumbent regime systematically cracked down on these ventures, cutting off the rebels’ sources of wealth out of fear they would finance their movements.

Furthermore, the regime successfully challenged the rebels militarily, leading to territorial losses and weakened positions. Facing an unwinnable war and with reduced bargaining power at the negotiating table, rebel groups ultimately signed the peace agreement. For many, this was a strategic move to secure positions within the government—a way to recover their lost wealth and power through state institutions.

The subsequent Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity (R-TGoNU) and its peace implementation process have been plagued by political and financial setbacks, resulting in a painfully slow pace.

This protracted timeline has caused impatience among the former ‘bush politicians’ and generals who were primarily motivated by the promise of positions, power, and privilege. Their failure to quickly access the wealth and benefits attached to high office led to frustration.

The incumbent regime seized this opportunity, engaging in a strategic campaign of “fishing for men.” By offering “carrots and cakes” (positions, money, and power), the regime has successfully induced defections of both political operatives and military generals. Once defected, these individuals often resort to vile public statements against their former leaders to emphatically register their new allegiance.

The problem is exacerbated by the structure of the peace agreement itself. The allotted positions for each political party have proven insufficient to accommodate all members. This has triggered internal squabbles, sidelining many who now have no realistic hope of securing an official post.

This lack of guaranteed future livelihood has left many feeling they have no choice but to seek “backdoor channels“ to secure their personal futures. This pursuit is amplified by the country’s devastating economic crisis, which has made the poor poorer and intensified the pressure on power-driven elites to acquire wealth by any means.

Ultimately, the mass defections reveal a system where personal gain and the recovery of lost financial power have outshined the commitment to genuine peace implementation. The peace process, for many of its participants, has merely become a transactional marketplace for elite accommodation.