The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, 2011, grants the President, as head of state and government, sweeping executive powers to appoint and dismiss top officials. President Salva Kiir has frequently exercised this power to appoint and remove national ministers, advisors, governors, and other key figures within the executive branch. The stream of decrees appointing and removing government officials has become a near-continuous feature of South Sudanese politics.
Most recently, on Monday, President Kiir issued a decree shuffling top officials in the Ministry of Finance and Planning and sacking staff within the Office of the Presidency. Consistent with previous occasions, these officials are typically relieved without any publicly stated reasons. Whether due to underperformance, embezzlement of public funds, or serious abuses of office, the citizens are often left without knowledge or clue as to the justification for the decision.
The political landscape in South Sudan is deeply intertwined with ethnicity, which is often leveraged as a tool for political allegiance and patronage. When the President appoints an individual from a specific community to a top government position, congratulatory messages frequently flood mainstream and social media from that community. Unknowingly, the appointed official is expected to serve the entire nation, but this scenario often sees their community members throwing their unwavering support behind “their son or daughter.”
What is particularly unusual is the recycling of previously fired officials back into positions of power. This invites fundamental questions: Why were these officials removed in the first place? And why are they being brought back? These questions remain unanswered, fueling public speculation.
Behind the scenes, lobbyists are constantly at work, attempting to influence the appointing authority’s decisions in their favor, often at the cost of ordinary citizens. Key positions, such as the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank, are seen as highly lucrative by those looking to fulfill personal interests and those of their cliques, using them as avenues to access public treasury cash.
The constant threat of a presidential decree creates profound instability and anxiety among government officials. This fear of imminent removal discourages long-term planning and good governance; instead, officials may resort to acquiring personal wealth faster before they are potentially sacked. The decrees compel them to tune in to the national television at 8:00 PM in a nightly ritual of dread. If they are not fired, they simply smile and wait for the next day. An official performing well can be easily dethroned if lobbyists make a breakthrough, with little regard for their actual performance.
This culture of anxiety and high turnover has led to inconsistency in national policymaking and, ultimately, poor service delivery. The Ministries of Finance and the Central Bank are central to the economy, but without sustained and clear economic and monetary policies over a long period, the country’s economy cannot grow. Officials in these critical institutions are supposed to work with clear consciences and serve without fear so their policies can bear results, not just immediately, but in the long term. This environment demands that the presidency exercise much closer and more rigorous scrutiny.
The Constitution currently does not fully safeguard the process, as it does not lay down explicit benchmarks or conditions for the appointment and removal of officials. Introducing such criteria could introduce a measure of accountability, stability, and focus on performance over patronage.
God Protect South Sudan.
Be the spectator